Abstract-This paper compares the comovement of individual stock returns across emerging markets. Campbell et al. and Morck et al. have shown that the United States saw rising firm-specific stock return variations, and thus declining comovement, over the second half of the twentieth century. We detect a similar, albeit weaker, pattern in most, but not all, emerging markets. We further find that higher firm-specific variation is associated with greater capital market openness, but not goods market openness. Moreover, this relationship is magnified by institutional integrity (good government). Goods market openness is associated with higher marketwide variation.
I. Introduction
T HE extent to which individual stock prices move independently varies both across countries and over time. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000a) find the ratio of idiosyncratic (firm-specific) variation to total variation in individual stock returns to be higher in higher-income economies in the mid 1990s. Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000a) find a long-term rise in idiosyncratic variation in U.S. stock returns. A series of studies, including Wurgler (2000) , Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2002) , Bushman, Piotrovsky, and Smith (2002) , Durnev et al. (2004, pp. 3a,b) , and others relates greater idiosyncratic variation, or lower comovement in individual stock returns, to a range of measures of the institutional development, regulatory sophistication, and capital allocation efficacy of the stock market. Other work, too extensive to list, documents a relationship between financial development and economic openness. This study documents a strong statistical correlation between capital market openness in emerging markets and idiosyncratic stock return variation. We focus on emerging markets because developed stock markets are fully open to foreign investors for the full period over which large panels of returns data are available.
We first show that the findings of Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000a) of rising idiosyncratic variation in U.S. stocks are also evident in the majority of emerging markets over the 1990s. We then show that higher idiosyncratic variation is significantly correlated with greater capital market openness in emerging market economies with sound institutions. However, capital market openness and poor institutions may actually increase comovement. Trade openness generally increases comovement.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section II describes our conceptual starting points. Section III describes our methodology, and section IV presents our empirical findings. Section V presents a case study, and section VI concludes.
II. Individual Stock Return Comovement and Openness
The total variation in an individual stock return can be decomposed into idiosyncratic variation, which is specific to the stock, and systematic variation, which is explained by market returns. A natural measure of comovement is thus systematic variation as a fraction of total variation. Since comovement can be large either because systematic variation is large or because idiosyncratic variation is small, it also makes sense to look at these quantities explicitly. For brevity, we refer to all of these variables as measuring "comovement. " Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000a) document rising absolute and relative firm-specific variation in U.S. stocks. Morck et al. (2000a) also find that firm-specific variation is a greater part of total variation in more developed countries. They are unable to explain these differences with differences in macroeconomic stability, country or market size, economy structure, or firm-specific variation in fundamentals (returns on assets). Rather, greater official corruption is highly correlated with more comovement; and, in countries with below-average corruption, stronger investor protection laws are associated with higher firm-specific variation.
Comovement and related phenomena matter for two general classes of reasons. These reasons interact with the increasing global integration of capital markets, as documented by Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 1997) and others.
The first class of reasons relates to portfolio risk. Campbell et al. (2001) note that many investors are not fully diversified, and so are exposed to greater risk when firmspecific variation is greater. They further show that greater firm-specific variation means investors need larger portfolios to diversify fully and argue that greater firm-specific variation should affect option prices, which depend on firm-specific plus market-related variation in the return of the underlying asset. Chen and Knez (1995) argue that, as barriers to capital flows drop, cross-border arbitrage affects asset prices across markets. Thus, information about industries, exposures, or discount rates that affects prices in one country also affects prices elsewhere. Some of this information is about the whole market, but much is about sectors, and should show up as idiosyncratic risk.
The second class of reasons has to do with the real economy. We now review each of these reasons in turn.
First, La Porta, Lopez-de-Salines, and Shleifer (1999) find most large, publicly traded firms outside the United States and United Kingdom organized into corporate groups. A single controlling shareholder, usually a very wealthy family, controls all the firms in such a groupdirectly or indirectly. Group firms finance each other, do business with each other, adopt common strategies, and otherwise coordinate decisions. This could give their fundamentals a common component. Such intercorporate dealings might steadily transfer wealth from one group firm to another, and public shareholders of a wealth-losing group firm understandably view this as a corporate governance problem, which Johnson et al. (2000) dub tunneling. Perhaps comovement gauges the importance of corporate groups and of tunneling.
As Coffee (2002) , Karolyi and Stulz (2003) , Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000b) , Rajan and Zingales (2003) , Stulz (1999) , and others note, capital market openness pressures regulators to adopt international best practices in disclosure, governance, and regulation. It also creates local demand for information professionals, like accountants and analysts. Both changes might render tunneling more difficult. The result might be less comovement in both firm fundamentals and returns.
Second, economic growth arises from technological progress. Schumpeter (1912) holds that this occurs as innovative firms rise to displace established industry leaders, in a process he dubs creative destruction. More intense creative destruction thus causes the fundamentals of innovative and laggard firms to differ more. Caves (1982) argues that openness to outward foreign direct investment (FDI) raises the rewards to innovators by allowing greater economies of scale, and that openness to inward FDI allows technology spillovers from multinationals to local firms. Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Morck et al. (2000b) argue that foreign portfolio investment (FPI) openness bolsters local technological progress by letting entrepreneurial startups obtain financing from abroad. Thus, general capital market openness might let innovative firms outpace sedate rivals faster, magnifying firm-specific differences in returns.
Third, neoclassical trade theory links trade openness to specialization. Trade openness should thus reduce an economy's diversification across industries, perhaps turning industry factors into market factors and raising fundamentals comovement. Also, if capital openness accompanies trade openness, a positive correlation between capital openness and comovement might ensue.
However, tunneling, innovation, and specialization all affect returns comovement only by affecting fundamentals comovement. Morck et al. (2000a) cannot explain returns comovement with fundamentals (return on assets) comovement. 1 Either their fundamentals comovement measure is inadequate (a possibility, given the low frequency of fundamentals data), or some other explanation is paramount.
The latter possibility leads them to consider alternative explanations. Comovement may be symptomatic of market inefficiencies, such as bubbles or herding. If more open capital markets experience fewer bubbles and less herding, they might exhibit less comovement. Alternatively, critics of globalization argue that openness spreads crises. For example, the Bernama News Agency quoted Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad blaming Malaysia's economic crisis on international financiers who "robbed the Palestinians of everything, but in Malaysia they could not do so, hence they do this, depress the ringgit." 2 More sagaciously, Bhagwati (1998) argues that capital market openness can spread financial crises, and that only product market openness is justified; and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) study contagion as a factor in market fluctuations.
However, Morck et al. (2000a) and Campbell et al. (2001) show that changes in comovement are due, in part at least, to changes in idiosyncratic variation, as opposed to marketwide variation. Roll (1988) argues that idiosyncratic variation reflects trading by investors with private firmspecific information, and Morck et al. (2000a) and Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) speculate that more idiosyncratic variation reflects periods of especially intense trading by such investors, and hence more accurate pricing, at least in the short term. However, Campbell et al. (2001) dispute this, noting correctly that West (1988) links less information to higher returns variation. Their intuition is that as information is revealed, a previously more erroneously priced stock exhibits larger return fluctuations.
Regardless, a growing body of empirical work links greater idiosyncratic variation to variables that, on the surface at least, are plausible proxies for the information content of stock prices. Some of this work links higher firm-specific return variation to variables readily interpretable as gauging informed arbitrage. Greater idiosyncratic variation is evident in countries with stronger insider trading prohibitions (Beny, 2000) , more developed financial analy-sis industries and a freer press (Bushman et al., 2002) , and fewer short sales restrictions (Bris et al., 2002) . Other work looks at the information content of stock returns more directly. Durnev et al. (2003b) find significantly higher firm-specific returns variation following a major historical tightening in U.S. disclosure law for affected stocks, but not for others. Durnev et al. (2003a) find returns more accurately predicting future earnings changes in industries whose stocks move more idiosyncratically. Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn (1987) and others regard such predictive power as gauging the "information content" of stock prices. Yet more work links greater idiosyncratic variation to better capital allocation. Wurgler (2000) finds capital flows more responsive to value added in countries where returns comove less. Durnev et al. (2004) show U.S. industries in which idiosyncratic variation is higher exhibiting fewer signs of both overinvestment and underinvestment. Tobin (1982) defines the market as functionally efficient if price changes induce efficient capital allocation, and his two studies speculate that less comovement and greater idiosyncratic variation signify more functionally efficient markets. Reconciling these findings with the West (1988) framework and related literature, such as Campbell and Shiller (1987) , is an exciting avenue for future research.
Our objective here is more limited-to see if the U.S. pattern of rising idiosyncratic variation extends to emerging markets, and to see what factors correlate with the magnitudes of this change across countries. In doing this, we need to consider factors that affect many countries, but to differing degrees.
One such factor is the increasing globalization of capital markets. We make no pretense that globalization is the only such factor. However, a study of all possible factors is beyond the scope of this effort. We focus on globalization because economic openness, especially to capital flows, has changed to different degrees in different countries over the past decade, and in ways that can be measured-albeit with difficulty. By considering how capital market openness might interact with the different explanations of comovement advanced above, we can explore their validity and implications.
III. Methodology

A. Estimating the Comovement Variables
Our main comovement measures are based on modified market model regressions for individual securities. Let the return on stock j in period t be r jt , the domestic market return for country n at t be r nt , and the U.S. market return at t be r mt (converted to local currency). To assess the comovement of individual stocks in country n during period , we run the regression
separately for each stock j ʦ n, using all T j observations t ʦ . The transformed domestic market return r njt is the equal-weighted average return of all stocks in n except j itself,
where J nt is the number of stocks in country n at time t. We thus use a different domestic market return for each regression. This is because we are interested in the comovement of stock j with other stocks, not with itself. In economies with a small number of traded stocks, this eliminates a potential upward bias in our comovement measures. A simple variance decomposition expresses the sum of squared variation in r jt , denoted s j 2 , as the sum of the squared variation explained by equation (1), m s j 2 , and the residual variation ε s j 2 . The systematic variation in stock j
where T j is the number of return observations for firm j in during .
To estimate country-level analogs, we take an average of the J n firm-level measures in each country n weighted by the number of observations on each firm. Thus, the average absolute firm-specific return variation for stocks in country n during interval is
We interpret a larger ε n 2 as signifying less comovement in individual returns.
An analogous procedure generates the average absolute systematic return variation for stocks in country n during time interval ,
We interpret a greater m n 2 as signifying more comovement in individual returns.
Scaling the firm-specific by the total variation n 2 , obtained analogously to equations (3) and (4), we obtain the average R 2 statistic of the regression (1) for stocks in country n during time interval ,
To gauge the importance of systematic variation as a fraction of total variation in country n, we can define a countrylevel analog,
the average relative systematic variation in the stocks of country n during interval . We take a lower R n 2 as signifying less comovement.
To construct these measures, we download a time series of Wednesday-to-Wednesday returns for every stock in DataStream, deleting returns with zero or missing volume at either endpoint. Using weekly returns economizes on downloading time. DataStream contains coding errors, especially for Latin America, due to misplaced decimal points. An algorithm checks for such errors and drops affected observations.
B. Regression Framework
We seek to explain comovement with measures of openness to the global economy, taking into account the different levels of institutional development in different countries. We thus run panel regressions of the form comovement measure ϭ fixed effects ϩ ␤ 1 ϫ ͑openness measure͒ ϩ ␤ 2 ϫ ͑openness measure͒ (7) ϫ ͑institutional development͒ ϩ n .
We follow Morck et al. (2000a) in using as dependent variables the natural logarithm of country-level average firm-specific variation, ln( ε n 2 ); that of the systematic variation, ln( m n 2 ); and the difference between them, which we denote by the Scandinavian letter ø n . 3 Note that ø n is a logistic transformation of the R 2 measure, for
Since m n 2 and ε n 2 are bounded below by 0, and R n 2 is in the unit interval, these transformations are necessary to provide approximately normal dependent variables.
We use several alternative measures to capture different aspects of openness.
We define trade openness as suggested by Frankel (2000) ,
where M n is total imports and Y n is gross domestic product (GDP). If national borders do not affect buying patterns, imports divided by GDP equals 1 minus the nation's share of world production, leaving the value of the openness measure equal to 0. In a completely closed economy the variable's value is Ϫ1 plus the country's GDP as a fraction of world GDP. As the country becomes more open, the measure rises towards 0. Trade openness can rise above 1 for an entrepôt state. Frankel (2000) recommends this measure in lieu of the traditional imports plus exports divided by GDP, which tends to be larger for smaller economies.
We construct the variable using data from World Development Indicators 2002, produced by the World Bank. For our sample, the variable is always negative. Note, however, that we exclude the city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong, which are probably the most important entrepôt countries. Hong Kong is a particularly special case because of its switch from a U.K. colony to a Chinese special administrative region during our sample period.
Measuring capital market openness is more difficult, for investment stock and flow measures are often highly problematic. We therefore use a carefully developed capital market openness measure provided by Edison and Warnock (2002) . This is a direct measure of the openness of each country's stock market to foreign investors. Essentially, it reflects the value of stocks that can be purchased by foreign investors as a percentage of total domestic market capitalization. 4 It is closer to 1 if a market is more open, and closer to 0 if it is more closed.
The index is available for most emerging markets from 1990 through 2001, though it is unavailable for some in the very early 1990s. Since developed country stock markets were essentially fully open to foreign investors throughout the 1990s, the index has no variation for these markets. Consequently, we restrict our attention to emerging markets.
The capital and trade openness are not highly correlated ( ϭ Ϫ0.001, p ϭ 0.99). Although many countries with open capital markets have open goods markets, there are notable exceptions: Indonesia (capital market openness rises, while trade openness shows no consistent trend), Malaysia and the Philippines (capital market openness shows no consistent trends, but trade openness rises), and Pakistan (capital market openness rises while the goods market becomes more closed).
To assess institutional development, we use the good government measure constructed by Morck et al. (2000a) . This measure sums three variables from La Porta et al. (1999) that gauge the respect a country's government shows for the rule of law, the efficiency of its legal system, and the freedom of its government and civil servants from corruption. Each individual measure ranges from 0 to 10, so good government lies between 0 and 30, with larger numbers connoting better institutions. This variable is available only as a cross section.
All our regressions control for country, year, and crisis fixed effects.
Including country fixed effects nets out own-country averages. We do this because Morck et al. (2000a) link comovement to a variety of variables having to do with economy structure, economy size, and fundamentals comovement. We have no reliable measures of how these factors change through time for each country, and therefore subsume them into general fixed effects. We recognize that this may not capture their full effects. If their changes are correlated with changing openness, our openness variable might pick up effects that, more properly, should be ascribed to changes in these other variables. If these other effects are themselves also associated with economic openness, this is defensible. If they are not, we must interpret our openness variable more broadly, as perhaps capturing part of a broader range of institutional or other changes. Year fixed effects capture global macroeconomic factors and control for any general time trend in our data.
A number of emerging economies experienced financial crises during the 1990s. Hence, we include three crisis dummies to capture transitory changes in comovement associated with the unusual conditions prevailing in the affected markets. The Asian crisis dummy is 1 for East Asian countries in 1997 and 1998, and 0 otherwise. The Mexican peso crisis dummy is 1 for Latin American countries in 1995, and 0 otherwise. Finally, the Brazilian real crisis dummy is 1 for Latin American countries in 1998, and 0 otherwise. Table 1 lists the countries in our final sample. The list of countries in Table 1 is the intersection of those for which Edison and Warnock's (2002) capital openness measure is available, those for which the good-government index is available, and those for which DataStream stock returns are available. We go back only to the 1990s, because stock return data for earlier years are unavailable on DataStream for many countries. We thus have annual comovement measures from 1990 to 2001 for most countries. We require that five years of comovement data be available to include Comovement is measured by the average market model R 2 (R n 2 ), the average firm-specific variation (ε n 2 ), and the average systematic variation (m n 2 ). Capital openness is value-weighted fraction of the market open to foreign investors. Trade openness is imports/GDP relative to GDP/(world GDP). Good government is a cross-section index taking low values where corruption is worse. Data are for 1990 through 2001.
C. Sample
FIGURE 1.-CHANGING COMOVEMENT IN INDIVIDUAL STOCKS IN EMERGING MARKET
Annual comovement measures are derived from market model regressions of weekly individual stock returns on domestic and U.S. market returns, and include the average regression R 2 , the systematic (explained) variation in the average stock's returns, and the firm-specific (residual) variation in the average stock's returns. a country in our panel. Our trade openness variable is unavailable for Taiwan (ROC).
The resulting panel contains annual measures for 17 countries from 1990 to 2001 with 183 country-year observations. We have less than a full panel because data for some countries are unavailable in the early 1990s. Table 1 displays univariate statistics. Figure 1 summarizes the pattern across all emerging economies. Panel A, weighting each country equally, reveals falling R n 2 and m n 2 , and rising ε n 2 , though none are monotonic. Panel B, weighting each stock equally with no regard to its country, reveals a similar picture. Table 2 presents a statistical description of the patterns in Figure 1 . Because we have only 12 observations, lag estimation and unit root tests are problematic. Still, panel A shows consistent positive trend point estimates in tests with and without first-order lags and both assuming and disavowing a unit root. Unfortunately, the statistical significance is sporadic. For comparison, we present the same tests using U.S. data for 1990 to 2001, and obtain similarly inconclusive findings, and even a positive trend in R 2 . When we extend the U.S. data back to 1963 (not shown), we reproduce the trends detected by Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000a) -a rising ε 2 and a declining R 2 . Panel B estimates ε n 2 , m n 2 , and R n 2 from firm data for the first and last halves of our sample period-dropping the middle two years to mitigate autocorrelation problems. F-tests show an unambiguous rise in firm-specific variation, a smaller rise in systematic variation, and a resultant decline in R n 2 -all highly significant. As a robustness check, we conduct a bootstrapping (B) test by recalculating the average first subperiod ε n 2 , m n 2 , and R n 2 in each country 100 times, using 30 randomly selected stocks each time. This generates a distribution for the first-subperiod average firmspecific variation. The p-level for rejecting equal average Tests to reject equal firm-specific mean variation across subperiods. F-test degrees of freedom correspond to firm observations. Bootstrap (B) tests to reject equal average firm-specific variation in the two subperiods recalculate the average first-subperiod firm-specific variations 100 times using 30 randomly selected stocks each time. This provides a probability distribution for first subperiod average firm-specific variation. The p-level is the mass in the tail of this distribution beyond the second-subperiod sample average firm-specific variation. Subperiods are noncontiguous to mitigate autocorrelation and are of equal length. All emerging market stocks are weighted equally regardless of country. firm-specific variation in the two subperiods is the tail of this distribution beyond the second-subperiod sample ε n 2 , m n 2 , or R n 2 . These tests show a significant rise in firmspecific variation in emerging markets as a whole, a smaller increase in systematic variation, and an insignificant decline in R 2 . Analogous U.S. figures for the same period show a rise in m n 2 and R n 2 in the 1990s; however, this is again a short-term phenomenon. Similar techniques applied over a longer time series of U.S. data, from 1963 to 2001, confirm the rising ε n 2 and falling R n 2 noted by Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000a) .
IV. Findings
The last panel of table 2 reproduces the trend tests and subsample tests from panels A and B for each individual emerging market. Of the 68 trend point estimates, 47 are positive, and 8 are statistically significant-consistent with broadly rising firm-specific variation. In contrast, only 2 of the 21 negative trend estimates are significant. F-tests and bootstrapping tests are more definitive, indicating significantly higher firm-specific variation in 12 of our 17 emerging markets-Colombia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Taiwan, and Thailand. F-tests indicate declining firmspecific variation only in Brazil, Chile, Greece, Peru, and Turkey; and bootstrapping tests are significant only for Chile, Peru, and Turkey.
Space constraints prevent the inclusion of detailed descriptions of our other comovement variables. In 12 of our 17 countries we observe a decline in R n 2 measured analogously. In 11 countries, m n 2 rises. During crisis years, ε n 2 and m n 2 both spike. Because the latter rises more, R n 2 also spikes. These observations are unsurprising, at least on the surface. 5 As a robustness check, we repeat the F and B tests in table 2 using the first and last pairs of years of data for each country, rather than the first and last halves of the sample 5 Economic crises, by their very nature, are systematic. They affect broad swaths of firms and industries simultaneously, and so are apparent as elevated systematic variation. Firm-specific variation can rise too, for the crisis may affect some firms or sectors more than others, and may even present opportunities to some firms. If crises also correspond to manias and panics, market swings due to noise trading might also heighten comovement. Comovement is measured by average market model R 2 (R n 2 ), average firm-specific variation (ε n 2 ), and average systematic variation (m n 2 ). a Trend and variation figures are estimates ϫ 10 2 . period, and generate broadly similar results. Unitroot-invariant trend tests, as suggested by Vogelsang (1998) , indicate uniform insignificance, but are barely identified.
Our focus is on how openness and institutions correlate with comovement. These same factors may affect the virility and incidence of crises, so crises cannot really be disentangled from them. However, a thorough analysis of the interactions of crises with institutions, openness, and stock return variation is beyond the scope of this study, though we are pursuing it elsewhere. Nonetheless, we clearly must control for transitory effects during crises when we evaluate the determinants of their more permanent levels. We return to this issue below. Table 3 reports our regression results. The leftmost panel shows no relationship between trade openness and absolute firm-specific variation. Capital openness and its cross product with good government are both significantly related to higher firm-specific variation. When both are included in regression 3.6, the individual coefficients are insignificant and capital openness per se switches sign. Although an F-test shows the two to be jointly significant, collinearity problems make interpreting the point estimates problematic. If we ignore such problems, a good-government index above 11 induces a positive relationship between capital openness and absolute firm-specific variation.
The center panel shows openness in trade significantly positively related to absolute systematic variation and unrelated to firm-specific variation. The cross term between trade openness and good government in regression 3.9 is also positive and statistically significant. Trade openness is associated with greater marketwide variation.
The rightmost panel shows that trade openness is positively related to the comovement measure ø n . When we include both trade openness and its cross term with good government in regression 3.17, trade openness has a positive coefficient and the cross term has a negative one, both insignificant. However, the F-statistic indicates joint significance. In contrast, capital market openness is significantly associated with lower systematic variation relative to the total. Again, the cross product with institutional development is significantly negative. Both remain significant when included together in regression 3.20; however, capital openness takes a positive sign, and the cross term becomes negative. Including both trade and capital openness and both cross terms in regression 3.21 leaves the point estimates of the two capital openness terms virtually unchanged from regression 3.20. The point estimates in regression 3.21, which are both individually and jointly significant, imply that a goodgovernment index greater than 19 makes the overall effect of capital openness on comovement negative. The mean value for the good-government measure is 19.
A. Robustness Checks
We repeat all our results using comovement measures estimated with a simple domestic market model, rather than equation (1). Our results remain qualitatively similar, by which we mean the signs and statistical significance of regression coefficients in analogs to the tables shown are preserved. Likewise, using DataStream's global market return, rather than the U.S. market return, as the second factor in equation (1) produces qualitatively similar results. Using value weighting, rather than equal weighting, in constructing the local index also yields qualitatively similar results.
As alternative comovement measures, we employ the average correlation between all possible pairs of thirty stocks, randomly selected in each country for each period, and the fraction of stocks moving with the market. Regressions explaining logistic transformations of these measures of comovement closely resemble the regressions explaining ø n .
To ascertain that our results are not due to comovement changes associated with crises, we repeat our regressions, dropping all observations for which any of the three crisis dummies described above is 1. The results are virtually unchanged, and the panel regression R 2 's rise. Dropping the crisis dummies and including all observations also generates results similar to those shown, as does including only country fixed effects.
As a further robustness check, we use an alternative capital openness measure constructed by Abiad and Mody (2002) . 6 Unfortunately, this is available only up to 1996. It yields a pattern of signs and coefficients similar to those shown, but with much lower significance levels, probably due to the smaller intersection of that measure with our comovement estimates.
Substituting the simple trade openness measure of imports plus exports divided by GDP for the Frankel (2000) trade measure generates similar patterns of signs and significance to those shown.
Cook's D-statistics indicate that outliers are not driving our results. Tests for heteroskedasticity reject the need for modified t-tests.
V. A Case Study
A case in point to illustrate the situation is the contrast between two eastern European countries, Poland and the Czech Republic. Both countries experienced a flurry of new legislation in 1991 and 1992 establishing basic market economy institutions. However, Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleiter (2001) show that the two countries then followed very different trajectories. The judicial systems remained ill developed in both countries. However, strict Polish regulatory enforcement contrasted starkly with the hands-off regulation inspired by the libertarian philosophy of the Czech government. Glaeser et al. (2001) argue that this stunted the development of the Czech financial system relative to that of Poland, and stress the need for law enforcement, by either the judiciary or regulators, to make markets work.
Neither country is included in our sample, because of the unavailability of complete stock market and institutional development data. However, by downloading daily data from DataStream and following precisely the same procedure outlined in section III, we were able to construct a set of bimonthly comovement measures for these countries. 7 Figure 2 shows an upward trend in firm-specific variation in Poland and a downward trend in the Czech Republic in the latter years of the 1990s, as both opened their economies in preparation for accession to the European Union. This is confirmed in Table 4 , where Polish data show a highly significant positive trend in ε 2 and negative trends in systematic variation, both absolute and relative to total variation. Since a unit root cannot be rejected in the last of these measures, unit-root-invariant tests are used to confirm a significant negative trend in R 2 . In contrast, the Czech Republic shows no trend in ε
2
. F-tests and bootstrapping (B) tests akin to those in table 2 show an even greater contrast, indicating an actual decline in ε 2 for Czech stocks. Poland's R 2 is much higher than its Czech counterpart early on, and falls to levels comparable with the latter as Polish marketwide variation abates. However, simple convergence cannot be a complete explanation, because panel B shows Polish firm-specific variation concordantly rising from 0.000954 to 0.001414, while Czech firm-specific variation falls from 0.000828 to 0.000573. The contrast illustrates how opening is associated with reduced comovement and higher firm-specific variation only if the institutions protect private property rights.
VI. Conclusions
Firm-specific variation in individual stock returns rises, though not monotonically, during the 1990s in most, but not all, emerging markets. Thus, the rising firm-specific variation detected by Morck et al. (2000a) and Campbell et al. (2001) in U.S. stocks is an international phenomenon.
This effect seems related to globalization. Greater capital market openness is associated with higher firm-specific variation and hence lower comovement in countries with institutional integrity (good government). In contrast, goods market openness is generally associated with higher systematic variation, and hence greater comovement.
Unfortunately, individual stock returns are not electronically available in most countries before 1990. This means we cannot control meaningfully for sectoral shocks and the like, and that the power of time series tests is low. Thus our finding must be taken as preliminary. Moreover, the interrelations among our openness variables, and between them and other measures of development, are doubtless complicated. It may be that our openness measures are proxies for other more nuanced aspects of development. With these caveats in mind, we can tentatively consider possible implications of our results.
Although there is near-uniform agreement among economists that trade openness is welfare-enhancing, capital openness is subject to debate, with many, such as Bhagwati (1998) , arguing that it creates scope for destabilizing marketwide fluctuations-so-called "hot money" problems. Our results suggest that such concerns can be overstated. We find marketwide fluctuations associated with trade openness, not capital openness. In retrospect, this is reasonable, for trade openness is thought to induce greater specialization, converting industry effects into marketwide fluctuations. If this is really happening, further study along these lines seems warranted.
Why capital openness is associated with higher firmspecific variation and lower comovement is at present un-clear. Candidate explanations include reduced tunneling due to greater transparency, a faster pace of creative destruction causing greater differences between innovators and laggards, less investor herding, and perhaps presently ill-understood differences in the cost structure of information and hence in the activity of informed arbitrageurs. Nevertheless, Wurgler (2000) , Durnev et al. (2004) , and others find higher firm-specific variation related to greater stock market functional efficiency, which Tobin (1982) defines as asset prices inducing an efficient distribution of capital goods.
Given these findings, and keeping the above-mentioned caveats in mind, the magnitude of firm-specific variation in a country's stocks presents itself as an interesting variable with which to examine institutional development, as suggested by the Czech Republic-Poland comparison above. Better institutions should cause the market to make a sharper distinction between firms with good prospects and firms with poor prospects and thus to allocate capital more efficiently. We believe that these findings suggest a new and potentially useful measure of the effectiveness of reforms in different countries. We tentatively propose that increasing firm-specific variation might be regarded as a gauge of the extent of real institutional reform.
The view outlined here is not new. In the Pure Theory of Capital, Hayek (1941, p. 6) argues that "the stock of capital is not an amorphous mass, but possesses a definite structure, that it is organized in a definite way, and that its composition of essentially different items is much more important than its aggregate 'quantity'." In a healthy economy, Hayek argues, different companies undertake different investments because their managers possess different levels of entrepreneurial ability, openness to innovation, and foresight. Some firms succeed and others Bimonthly comovement measures are derived from market model regressions of daily individual stock returns on domestic and U.S. market returns, and include the average regression R 2 , the systematic (explained) variation in the average stock's returns, and the firm-specific (residual) variation in the average stock's returns.
Systematic and firm-specific variation are plotted on the left axis; R 2 is on the right axis. Table 4 variation tests are based on a single regression for each firm across each subperiod, and are therefore not directly comparable with the annual regression figures displayed here.
fail as the economy grows through this ongoing process of creative destruction.
We recognize that ours is not the final word, and invite alternative explanations of the patterns we detect. We welcome ideas about how to distinguish such possibilities from the economic underpinnings we propose. Panel B. Tests rejecting equal firm-specific variation across subperiods. F-test degrees of freedom correspond to firm observations. Bootstrap (B) test recalculates average first-subperiod firm-specific variations 100 times using 30 randomly selected stocks each time. This provides a probability distribution for first-subperiod average firm-specific variation. The p-level is the mass in the tail of this distribution beyond the secondsubperiod sample average firm-specific variation. Subperiods are noncontiguous to mitigate autocorrelation and are of equal length. All emerging market stocks are weighted equally regardless of country.
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